










ike a number of other countries, the
United Kingdom now conducts 
monetary policy by reference to an
inﬂation target.1 The target is for the 12-
month percentage change of the RPIX—
the Retail Prices Index, excluding mort-
gage interest payments.  I should like to
begin by saying something about RPIX
speciﬁcally, before discussing some of the
general problems of measuring consumer
prices.
RPIX
The Retail Price Index is by far the
most widely used measure of inﬂation in
the United Kingdom.2 Its components
include an index of interest payments on
home mortgages, which has a weight of
4.2 percent.  Mortgages in the United
Kingdom are predominantly at ﬂoating—
rather than at ﬁxed—interest rates.  The
index of mortgage interest payments is cal-
culated using a long-term weighted
average of a house price index (the term of
the weighted average reﬂecting the average
age of home mortgages) and the current
level of mortgage interest rates.  This pro-
cedure means that changes in monetary
policy aimed at reducing inﬂation (by
raising interest rates) actually cause the
RPI to increase, and this makes the RPI
itself unsuitable for inﬂation targeting pur-
poses.3 The Bank of England has devised
another index, Housing-Adjusted Retail
Prices (HARP).  HARP incorporates an
alternative measure of the cost of owner-
occupied housing, based on the concept of
the user cost of housing.  The user cost is
the cost of servicing a mortgage, plus the
opportunity cost of the equity tied up in
housing (net of capital gains on the
house), plus depreciation and maintenance
costs.  The computation of HARP depends
on assumptions about borrowing rates,
alternative investment yields, and expected
capital gains on housing.  As a result,
HARP probably suffers from greater
measurement problems than RPIX.  The
use of RPIX means that housing costs are
under-represented in the inﬂation target.4
How much does it matter?  The ques-
tion can be addressed by investigating the
recent behaviour of RPIX and HARP.
Figure 1 shows the recent behavior of 
12-month percentage changes of the two
indexes, and the table below shows means
and standard deviations.  The distribu-
tions of 12-month changes in both RPIX
and HARP during the longer period are
bimodal (see Figures 2 and 3).  The
ﬁgures show an abrupt shift downwards
in each distribution between the earlier
and later parts of the period.  This is con-
sistent with the view that a break in the
inﬂationary process occurred during the
recession of the early 1990s.  Moreover it
is clear from Figure 1 that during the
1980s HARP inﬂation very obviously led
RPIX inﬂation by about two years, but
there is no clear parallel lead relationship
to be seen in the 1990s.
The early-1990s recession hit the
housing market particularly hard.  This
seems likely to have led to the demand for
housing as a store of wealth to be perma-
nently lower.  That in turn would be
expected to lead to a one-off fall in the
price of houses and thus the user cost of
owner-occupied housing, relative to other
prices.  It seems likely that this episode
changed the relationship between HARP
and RPIX—or at least it seems unsafe to
 
1 The Bank of England held a
conference in March 1995 
for central banks from inﬂation-
targeting countries.  See
Haldane (1995).
2 A very interesting account and
history of the RPI is provided by
Haworth (1995).  
3 For a lengthier exposition of
the drawbacks of the mortgage
interest component of the RPI,
see Bank of England (1993). 
4 They are not completely 
unrepresented, because RPIX
includes a housing rental ele-
ment (although the rental mar-
ket in the United Kingdom is not
large) and has since January
1995 included an allowance for
housing depreciation.
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assume that the relationship did not
change.  Analysis of the current signiﬁ-
cance of targeting RPIX rather than HARP
therefore has to be based on data from the
second part of the period, since October
1992.  Table 2 reports the results of tests
of the hypotheses that the means and stan-
dard deviations of 12-month changes in
RPIX and HARP during the period since
October 1992 are equal.  The validity of
the tests depends on the series in question
being normally distributed, and the hypoth-
esis that they are normally distributed
cannot be rejected.
As yet, a full business cycle has not
been completed since October 1992.  It is
therefore too soon to tell whether the sig-
niﬁcant difference between the mean
values of RPIX and HARP inﬂation since
1992 reﬂects a within-cycle ﬂuctuation in
the user cost of owner-occupied housing
relative to other prices, or whether it is
likely to persist from one cycle to the next.
To sum up, substantial evidence
points to a shift in inﬂationary behavior in
the early 1990s and good reason to believe
that the relationship between RPIX and
HARP changed then.  Not enough post-
shift evidence is available to support any
ﬁrm conclusions about the consequences
of targeting one index rather than the
other.
RPIX includes indirect taxes.  Since
February 1996, the Ofﬁce for National Sta-
tistics has published the Retail Price Index
excluding indirect taxes (RPIY). Econ-
omists argue that the index used for the
inﬂation target should exclude indirect
taxes because a phased increase in indirect
taxes that causes RPIX inﬂation to
increase for a lengthy period should not
provoke a 
 
tightening of monetary policy.  It
can however be argued that a phased
increase in indirect taxes could be
expected to cause RPIY inﬂation to
decrease for a lengthy period and that
such a result should equally not provoke
an easing of monetary policy.  Perhaps the
decisive argument is that indexes which
exclude indirect taxes are likely to be less
credible as inﬂation targets to the public at
large.
In addition to the issues speciﬁc to
RPIX, a number of difﬁcult and general
problems arise when measuring consumer
prices. 
Table 2
Results of Tests on RPIX and HARP
 
Test Period
Null Hypothesis October 1992-August 1996
Means of 12-month increases in 
RPIX and HARP are equal. Rejected
Standard deviations of 12-month 
increases in RPIX and HARP are equal. Not rejected
NOTE: The results were the same at both 95 percent and 99 percent conﬁdence levels.
Table 1
RPIX and HARP 12-Month
Percentage Changes
Standard
Mean deviation Highest Lowest
January 1984 - August 1996
RPIX 4.51 1.73 9.49 1.98
HARP 4.75 2.39 10.69 1.07
October 1992 - August 1996
RPIX 2.81 0.39 3.84 1.98
HARP 2.13 0.53 3.19 1.07
   
12-Month Percentage Changes
  in RPIX and HARP














Current Consumption or Current
plus Future Consumption: The
Treatment of Asset Prices
As a matter of principle, should the
chosen index represent the prices of goods
and services for immediate consumption
only, or should it represent the prices of
goods and services for both present and
future consumption?  Alchian and Klein
(1973) argue that the proper objective of
monetary policy should be deﬁned in terms
of an index of present and future consump-
tion, because an index conﬁned to goods
and services for current consumption fails
to recognize the scope for intertemporal
substitution in consumption.  In other
words, according to Alchian and Klein, the
price indexes used for monetary policy
purposes should include not only prices of
goods and services for current consump-
tion but also prices of present claims over
future goods and services.  Their argument
is extensively and approvingly quoted by
Goodhart (1995).
In practice, available consumer price
indexes are neither indexes of prices of
goods and services for current consump-
tion alone, nor are they price indexes of
both goods and services for current con-
sumption and present claims over future
consumption.  Of course they include
prices of goods and services for current
consumption, but they also include prices
of consumer durables, which provide
services for some period in the future, until
they wear out.  But available price indexes
do not include prices of present claims over
Distribution of 12-Month Percentage Changes in RPIX
Number of Observations
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goods and services for future consumption
other than services provided by consumer
durables that can be purchased now.
With few exceptions, markets for
future goods and services do not exist.
Accordingly, no possibility exists of pro-
ducing a price index of the kind Alchian
and Klein recommend.  But as they note 
(p. 176), “Since assets are sources of future
services, asset prices provide clues to prices
of present claims on future consumption.”
In other words, the practical implication of
Alchian and Klein’s argument is that mone-
tary policy should take account of asset
prices, as well as of conventional price
indexes.  Even so, asset prices need to be
interpreted with care, as Alchian and Klein
point out.  For example, a change in the
price of an asset may be caused simply by 
a reevaluation of the quantity or quality of
goods and services it is expected to pro-
duce in the future.  An asset price change
thus caused does not imply any change in
the price of present claims on future con-
sumption.  Moreover it is important to dis-
tinguish relative price changes among
assets (and changes of the price of goods
and services for current consumption rela-
tive to the price of present claims over
future consumption) from changes in the
general price level.  All these problems of
interpretation are, however, analogues of
problems that arise in the interpretation of
conventional price indexes: They are not
speciﬁc to asset prices.
It would be possible to arrive at the
same conclusion for monetary policy by
way of a different route, not involving
Alchian and Klein’s argument.  Suppose
that monetary policy were concerned
wholly with the prices of goods and ser-
vices for immediate consumption.  The
rate of inﬂation of those prices is not
affected immediately by monetary policy
actions; a time lag exists.  So monetary
policy has to be concerned with managing
the future rate of inﬂation and has to be
based on a forecast of what the future rate
of inﬂation will be.  That forecast will be
inﬂuenced by the current state of a wide
range of economic variables, including
asset prices.  In other words, it is not difﬁ-
cult to justify the assertion that monetary
policy should take account of asset prices.
THE IDEAL PRICE INDEX
If the ultimate objective of all econo-
mic activity is to produce consumer sat-
isfaction, then the ideal consumer price
index should measure the money cost of
achieving a particular level of utility.  Turn-
ing the economic concept into hard num-
bers is fraught with difﬁculties, however.
The RPI in the United Kingdom disclaims
the intention of measuring the cost of
maintaining a particular level of consumer
satisfaction.  To quote the Department of
Environment Retail Prices Index Advisory
Committee (1986):
We wish to reafﬁrm the view taken by
our predecessors that the RPI is an index
of price changes and not a “cost of
living” index.  It is not designed to mea-
sure the effect of changes in the kinds,
amounts and quality of the goods and
services people buy, or in the total
amount which needs to be spent in order
to live.  Nor does it measure changes in
the cost of maintaining a particular level
of consumer satisfaction.  The RPI mea-
sures the overall change in prices by
reference to the cost of a “basket” of
goods and services which in turn is based
on what households have actually spent
their money on, the contents of the bas-
ket being brought up to date at the begin-
ning of each year and then ﬁxed for
twelve months.  We believe this to be the
best practicable design for the index and
see no reason to try to change it.  How-
ever, we recognize that movements in
retail prices must be an important factor
in determining the cost of living however
this is deﬁned.
It is commonly acknowledged that
available price indexes overstate “true
inﬂation” as deﬁned by the ideal iso-
utility index.  There are several familiar
sources of bias: outlet substitution, pro-
duct substitution, quality changes and
new products.  Cunningham (1996) pro-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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vides guesstimates of the biases in the RPI
in the United Kingdom arising from these
sources (see Table 3).
The most difﬁcult conceptual issues
arise from new products.  In principle, the
introduction of any new product widens
consumer choice and makes it possible to
achieve a given level of utility at a cost
that may be lower than previously and
will certainly be no higher.  In other
words the introduction of any new
product has a neutral to negative effect on
the true price index.5
How large are these effects?  The
introduction of a new brand of chocolate
bar (if its price is the same as that of other
brands) probably makes a negligible
difference to the cost of achieving a given
level of utility because it is likely to be a
very close substitute for existing products.
New products that are not close sub-
stitutes for existing products perhaps fall
into two groups.  New products in the
ﬁrst group provide the same service to the
consumer as the old product, but at a
lower cost.  The introduction of such
products self-evidently reduces the cost of
achieving a given level of utility.  Concep-
tually, it is straightforward to take account
of this kind of technological improvement
in price measurement; however, in
practice it is extremely difﬁcult.  Nord-
haus (1994) shows how technological
improvements have reduced the cost of
lighting services in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.  He also reaches the
remarkable conclusion that traditionally
constructed price indexes would exag-
gerate the rate of inﬂation of the price of
lighting services over the period since
1800 by an average of 3.6 percent per
annum.
New products in the second group
provide services that were previously
unavailable.6 Treatment of such products
in price indexes is very difﬁcult in con-
cept, let alone in practice.  A good example
is the introduction of pharmaceutical pro-
ducts that can improve the quality of life
of people suffering from particular ail-
ments.  The introduction of such products
can make an enormous difference to these
people in the cost of achieving a given
level of utility.  The existence of such
products also reassures nonsufferers that,
if they contract the ailment, it can be
treated.  Such products are by no means
close substitutes for existing products.
Real life price indexes make no allow-
ance for new products in the second
group.  Nor could they.  If indexes were to
allow properly for such products, produ-
cers of statistics would need to know the
elasticity of substitution in demand
between new products and existing ones.
Estimates of the elasticity could be
obtained only after there had been time to
analyze the demand for the new product in
the light of experience.  The resulting
price index would by then be well out of
date.  There are, however, ample reasons
for wanting to know the true rate of inﬂa-
tion (i.e., the rate of inﬂation of the ideal
price index).  One approach to estimating
it could be to estimate an average amount
of bias in conventionally measured inﬂa-
tion and adjust the conventional index to
allow for it.  However, this procedure
would have to rest on the doubtful
assumption that the degree of bias was
constant over time (or that it varied
according to some predictable pattern).
The procedure would also have to rely on
a numerical estimate of the bias that would
be subject to a high degree of uncertainy.
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MONETARY POLICY
How much do the thorny problems of
measuring true inﬂation matter for mone-
5 Equally, the withdrawal of any
existing product has a neutral
to positive effect on the true
price index.  As a matter of
common observation, however,
the process of economic growth
has been accompanied by pro-
liferation of available products.
6 In practice new products do not
divide neatly into two groups in
the way I have suggested.  But
the two groups are a useful
expositional device and—for
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SOURCE: Cunningham (1996).tary policy?  The fact that these problems
are so intractable has some bearing on the
debate between inﬂation targeting and
price-level targeting.  Price-level targeting,
as its name suggests, means ﬁxing a target
path for the price level for some period in
the future.  If in the early part of the
period the price level moves above the
target path—in other words, if inﬂation
turns out higher than is implied by the
target path for the price level—then later
in the period the overshoot has to be cor-
rected.  That means that at some later
stage inﬂation has to be lower than is
implied by the target path for the price
level.  This is what distinguishes price-
level targeting from inﬂation targeting:
Inﬂation targeting does not require that a
period of above-target inﬂation has to be
compensated by a period of below-target
inﬂation.  In other words, inﬂation tar-
geting permits base drift in the price level,
whereas price-level targeting does not.
Under inﬂation targeting, the price level
follows a random walk.  Under price-level
targeting, the price level ﬂuctuates around
a predetermined path.
The attraction of price-level targeting is
that it appears to reduce longer term uncer-
tainty about the price level—something
that might, for example, be important to
those entering longer-term contracts
denominated in nominal money amounts.
Fischer (1994) summarizes the arguments
for and against price-level targeting.  No
country currently uses price-level targeting,
but some central bankers have seen price-
level targeting as a possible later stage of
development after inﬂation targeting.
A target path for the price level could
be calibrated only by reference to a mea-
sured price index.  However, the relation-
ship between the path of any measured
price index currently available and “true
inﬂation” as deﬁned by the ideal iso-utility
index is not known.  This implies that
there is a limit to the reduction in longer-
term uncertainty about the true price level
that can be achieved by targeting any mea-
sured price index.  In other words, the
attractions of price-level targeting are not
quite all that they might seem.  This is rel-
evant to the debate on price-level
targeting; although, perhaps not decisive
in resolving it.
More generally, it is impossible to
resist the comment that monetary manage-
ment in the United Kingdom in the nine-
teenth century and up to 1914 was widely
regarded as successful in securing and
maintaining price stability even though
there were no consumer price indexes at
all, let alone ideal ones.  Likewise, mone-
tary policy in most industrial countries in
the 1945-70 period is widely regarded as
having been generally successful, notwith-
standing the universal absence of ideal
price indexes.  It is difﬁcult, therefore, to
regard these measurement problems as nec-
essarily catastrophic for monetary policy.
They do, however, suggest that it is likely
to be difﬁcult to identify at all precisely a
growth rate of any available consumer
price index that can be conﬁdently claimed
to be consistent with price stability.
How then should the objective of
monetary policy be determined?  As a gen-
eralization, monetary management in both
the pre-1914 and 1945-70 periods
achieved price stability according to the
deﬁnition articulated by Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan (1989)—
namely “price levels sufﬁciently stable so
that expectations of change do not become
major factors in economic decisions.”  It is
going to be tough to arrive at a more pre-
cise objective than to secure price stability
according to that deﬁnition.
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